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The title of this book could be misleading because this is not a book on 
realism, as the editors Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein admit, but 
rather a tribute to Stephen D. Krasner and his contribution to international 
relations (IR) scholarship. The book itself is divided into five parts, each 
part containing, with some exceptions, three chapters written by different 
authors  (15 chapters altogether). The chapters were originally proposed 
for the conference held at Stanford University in December 2009. The 
five parts are entitled as follows: Part One: Power and Realism as an 
Intellectual Tradition; Part Two: Theoretical Reflections on Power, States 
and Sovereignty; Part Three: State Power and the Global Economy; Part 
Four: The Subversive Effects of Globalization; Part Five: Sovereignty and 
Power in a Complex World. I will now give a short summary of the book 
chapters that are contained within the five parts of this book. 
Part One contains three chapters. The first chapter, entitled “Puzzles about 
Power”, is written by the editors themselves. Finnemore and Goldstein 
ask themselves why state resources sometimes create power and policy 
success, and sometimes not. For them, this is a puzzle. Even when state 
resources create power this does not always translate into policy success. 
This means that the links between power and the outcome of the policies 
are not clear. In this sense the book tackles two concepts that are 
central to IR scholarship – states and power. But at the same time the 
editors warn us that this is not a book on realism, but rather a book on 
different approaches and different types of power that we can observe in 
contemporary international politics. They also tell us that this book tries to 
give an answer to the question: “in what world do states live”? What kind 
of world is it? The second chapter – “Power Politics in the Contemporary 
World: Lessons from the Scholarship of Stephen Krasner” – is also written by 
the editors themselves. This chapter is a “sheer tribute” to Krasner and his 
work. They remind us that Krasner “wrestled” with “Morgenthau’s disciples” 
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and with realism’s premises and limitations. Krasner abandoned, or rather 
challenged, the structural realist approach on state sovereignty in the 
international system. He started as a defender of realism, but later, in his 
empirical analysis, found the “limits of realism”. He realised that state power 
is important, but so are ideas. The third chapter, entitled “Stephen Krasner: 
Subversive Realist”, is written by Robert O. Keohane. This chapter could 
also be described as a tribute to Krasner’s scholarship. Here, Keohane 
describes different “phases” of Krasner’s work. Krasner could be called 
a “subversive realist” because he “flirted” with other approaches to IR 
such as institutionalism and constructivism. Therefore, Keohane believes 
that Krasner could be described as a realist, institutional theorist, and 
constructivist theorist as well. He states, as Krasner himself did, that Krasner 
belongs to a “modified realist orientation”.  
Part two of the book is comprised of four chapters. In the fourth chapter 
– “Authority, Coercion and Power in International Relations” – David A. 
Lake argues that IR cannot only be explained by material capabilities 
of the state and coercion. Therefore, the concept of authority deserves 
a comeback to the field of IR. Authority can also be seen as power. A 
can make B do something that B might otherwise not do without using 
coercion. Coercion comes into play only to defend authority or to 
restore it. In the fifth chapter, under the title “Governance under Limited 
Sovereignty”, Thomas Risse explains that “limited statehood” is not the 
same thing as “failed” or “failing statehood”. Risse argues that in the case 
of “limited statehood” international recognition (of the state) exists but 
domestic sovereignty is somehow lacking. Domestic sovereignty is here 
understood as the central government controlling some parts but not 
the whole territory. In this sense sovereignty is limited. On the other hand, 
failed states have no domestic sovereignty at all. Here, Risse poses the 
question how governance is possible and who governs in areas of limited 
statehood? In the next chapter – “Three Scenes of Sovereignty and 
Power” – Etel Solingen shows us that sometimes when states are trying to 
hold on to their sovereignty with a firm grip, they actually lose power. This is 
the case with North Korea, a state which has lost power due to its nuclear 
programme. On the other hand, when states abandon some forms of 
their sovereignty, as was the case with Germany and its military or China 
and its economy, that makes them more powerful. “States and Power as 
Ur-Force: Domestic Traditions and Embedded Actors in World Politics” is 
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the final chapter in this part of the book. Here, Peter J. Katzenstein argues 
that the rulers, and not the states, are the basic units of the international 
system. The question is then, are the rulers autonomous and rational? 
Katzenstein believes that US foreign policy, by adopting liberal values, is 
often ideological and irrational. But this also extends to the rulers of other 
traditions, making them not autonomous from value frameworks and thus 
irrational.  
Part three is again comprised of three chapters. In the next chapter – 
“Currency and State Power” – Benjamin J. Cohen reminds us that 
monetary power is “a neglected area of study” in international political 
economy. This chapter addresses the effects of international currency 
on state power. Today we have several states (the BRIC countries) in the 
international system that are trying to amplify their monetary power. In the 
chapter that follows, entitled “International Trade Law as a Mechanism 
for State Transformation”, Richard H. Steinberg argues that power shapes 
international law, which is then a mechanism for state transformation. 
In a nutshell, European and US power shaped the GATT/WTO rules, and 
by doing so they also used international trade law to transform other 
(weaker) states. Basically, for states to be able to join the GATT/WTO 
they first need to transform their institutions. “Choice and Constraint in 
the Great Recession of 2008” is the name of the last chapter in this part 
and the tenth chapter in the book overall. Here, Peter Gourevitch focuses 
on strong states and how the failure of their policies can endanger both 
themselves and other states as well. Units of his analysis are internal nation 
state (economic) policies. On the macro and micro level poor economic 
policies led to the 2008 crisis. They originated within the strong states, but 
then later spilled over into the weaker states of the international system. 
The fourth part of the book also contains three chapters. In the eleventh 
chapter, “Power Politics and the Powerless”, Arthur A. Stein states that 
weak states have no fear of attacking strong states. The opposite does 
not apply. According to him, strong states fear the weak ones. For him this 
is a conundrum in contemporary IR. The weak states use force for political 
mobilisation in their own communities and, in return, the strong states 
expand their definitions of security and respond with counter-political 
mobilisation. In the following chapter – “Globalization and Welfare: Would 
a Rational Hegemon Still Prefer Openness?” – Lloyd Gruber writes how 
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globalization may lead to inequality, but inequality need not necessarily 
cause political strife. The political elite is not necessarily divided even if 
there is a large cleavage in the society. Still, spatial cleavages may 
produce secession tendencies within states and/or cause conflicts. In 
chapter thirteen, under the title “The Tragedy of the Global Institutional 
Commons”, Daniel W. Drezner asks himself: “does the proliferation of rules, 
laws, norms, and organizational forms lead to an increase in rule-based 
outcomes, or merely an increase in forum shopping?” His answer is that 
institutional proliferation will encourage all actors to exploit the complex 
environment to advance their own (selfish) interests. Therefore, there 
will be no increase in rule-based outcomes, but rather, by using forum 
shopping, power outcomes are more likely, at least when great powers 
are concerned. 
The fifth and final part of the book contains only two chapters. In chapter 
fourteen – “Causation and Responsibility in a Complex World” – Robert 
Jervis tells us that several pathways could lead to the same result. This is 
known as multiple sufficient causation. The question is: are there alternative 
ways to reach the same outcome? If one policy was a success (policy A), 
why shouldn’t other policies (B, C, D...) also result in a positive outcome? 
This chapter deals with the causation, responsibility and chronology of 
the policies that states pursue in IR. The final chapter of the book, entitled 
“New Terrains: Sovereignty and Alternative Conceptions of Power”, is 
written by Stephen D. Krasner himself, the man this book is a tribute to. 
Krasner argues that power is what really counts in international affairs. 
However, states are not the only players in the international arena today. 
Much has changed since 1945. Power is not only material (tanks, ships, 
planes) but can also be manifested in non material ways. This is why, he 
argues, we have different kinds of power, and these concepts can still be 
broadened. 
In my humble opinion this is a much needed book and its timing could 
not be more perfect. The main topic of the book, as noted above, is the 
role that state power plays in the contemporary world. As Krasner himself 
tells us, much has changed since 1945. Furthermore, much has changed 
since 1989, and again since 2001. Although there are limits to realism, 
we can now witness a return to “power play” politics in IR. The cases of 
Russia and the Ukraine, Gaza, Iraq and Syria are clear examples of these 
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changes. Still, as Krasner and his “followers” show us, there are many faces 
of power and they cannot be clearly perceived only through realism, thus 
other theoretical approaches are needed to “paint the whole picture”. 
Theoretical eclecticism is the name of the game. I think this book should 
be mandatory reading for all IR scholars, graduate and PhD students that 
focus on international studies.
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